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Abstract
The right of access to civil justice is a cornerstone of the Belgian legal order.
At present time, however, financial barriers prevent about three quarters of the
Belgian population from fully asserting their subjective rights. As tradition-
ally, apart from legal aid, private funding is the dominant method of funding
a civil claim in Belgium, alternative funding options in between private and
public funding might hold some prospects for improving the access to civil us-
tice. Therefore this paper aims to provide an in-depth economic analysis of the
effects of cost shifting, client-lawyer fee arrangements and legal expenses insur-
ance on the various dimensions of the access to civil justice. In summary, the
main results from the analysis are that theoretically all three alternative fund-
ing methods may hold certain prospects for improving the accessibility of civil
justice. But, as far as empirical data are available, cost shifting fits least the
requirements for solving the policy issue addressed in this paper. However, the
validity of this empirical observation is subject to certain limitations. Both con-
tingency fees and legal expenses insurance hold clear prospects for overcoming
risk aversion and liquidity constraints. Also, relative to hourly fees, the incentive
scheme inherent to contingency fees appears most appropriate to curb lawyer
opportunism. The involvement of a legal expenses insurer may lead lawyers to
behave less opportunistically too. Finally, within the current legal framework,
insurers’ control of costs and quality requires their direct or indirect involvement
in the civil justice administration system. This may pose some challenging pol-
icy issues as the market for legal expenses insurance further develops in the
future.
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The right of access to civil justice is a cornerstone of the Belgian legal order. At present time, however, financial 
barriers prevent about three quarters of the Belgian population from fully asserting their subjective rights. As 
traditionally, apart from legal aid, private funding is the dominant method of funding a civil claim in Belgium, 
alternative funding options in between private and public funding might hold some prospects for improving the 
access to civil justice. Therefore this paper aims to provide an in-depth economic analysis of the effects of cost 
shifting, client-lawyer fee arrangements and legal expenses insurance on the various dimensions of the access to 
civil justice. In summary, the main results from the analysis are that theoretically all three alternative funding 
methods may hold certain prospects for improving the accessibility of civil justice. But, as far as empirical data 
are available, cost shifting fits least the requirements for solving the policy issue addressed in this paper. 
However, the validity of this empirical observation is subject to certain limitations. Both contingency fees and 
legal expenses insurance hold clear prospects for overcoming risk aversion and liquidity constraints. Also, 
relative to hourly fees, the incentive scheme inherent to contingency fees appears most appropriate to curb 
lawyer opportunism. The involvement of a legal expenses insurer may lead lawyers to behave less 
opportunistically too. Finally, within the current legal framework, insurers’ control of costs and quality requires 
their direct or indirect involvement in the civil justice administration system. This may pose some challenging 
policy issues as the market for legal expenses insurance further develops in the future.     
 
 
 
  Introduction  
 
The right of access to civil justice is a cornerstone of the Belgian legal order. In this respect 
reference can be made to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 13 
of the Belgian Constitution and the corresponding general principle of law. Furthermore, 
according to Article 23, 2° of the Belgian Constitution everyone is entitled to legal assistance. 
This social-civil right carries with it the government duty to prevent that financial barriers 
restrain subjective rights from being asserted2. At present time, however, this is only the case 
for about one quarter of the Belgian population: about 10 pct of the Belgians seeking justice 
                                                 
1 Award Winning Thesis, European Master Program in Law & Economics (EMLE), Academic Year 2005-2006. 
This paper, which is currently being revised, benefited from the comments of, among others, Louis T. Visscher 
and Jef De Mot. All mistakes are, of course, my own. Please, address any comments to Tom Schepens, Ghent 
University, School of Law, Center for Advanced Studies in Law & Economics, Universiteitstraat 4, B-9000 
Ghent, Belgium, e-mail: tom.schepens@ugent.be.  
2 Hoge Raad voor de Justitie (2002) at 7.  
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do not face any financial restriction and approximately 15 pct is eligible for legal aid3. For the 
other 75 pct of the population the fundamental policy question remains to be solved, how their 
financial access to civil justice can be improved.   
Traditionally, apart from legal aid, private funding is the dominant method of funding a civil 
claim in Belgium. That is, typically the costs of pursuing a civil lawsuit are, apart from minor 
exceptions, born by the plaintiff himself. Given the magnitude, unpredictably and timing of 
legal expenditures, there is little doubt that the current financial inaccessibility of civil justice 
stems mainly from a lack of alternative funding options in between private and public 
funding. In this paper, three possible options for bridging this funding gap are surveyed for 
their potential of improving the access to civil justice. Each of these alternatives entails a 
certain litigation cost reallocation: an indemnity rule shifts litigation costs from the prevailing 
to the losing party at trial, in a fee arrangement costs can be reallocated from the client to his 
lawyer, and finally, costs of litigation can be covered by a legal expenses insurer.     
Recently, the Belgian Supreme Court has implicitly pointed at the first of the 
abovementioned reallocation mechanisms as a possible solution to the policy question 
addressed in this paper. In a sequence of judgments, it has acknowledged the possibility that 
attorney and expert costs are shifted from the winning to the losing party at trail, first, in the 
area of tort law (judgment of February 28, 2002), thereafter, in the area of contract law 
(September 2, 2004) and finally, as a general principle of law (May 5, 2006)4,5. Not 
surprisingly, however, these judgments are fairly vague and admit of more than one 
interpretation. A fierce debate on cost shifting and its prospects for improving the access to 
civil justice was the anticipated result. When this paper was completed in August 2006, the 
legal vacuum the Supreme Court had left behind was still not filled. A legislative intervention 
that would make an end to the heated discussion was still awaited.  
Lately, also the other alternative funding options that are subject to this study, have gained 
in attention. In England and Wales, for example, conditional fee arrangements and legal 
expenses insurance moved to the fore after major reforms of the legal aid scheme in 1999. 
Further, the traditional success of legal expenses insurance in Germany and contingency fees 
representing the average person’s “key to the courthouse”6 in the US are both suggestive of 
the pivotal role cost reallocation can play in keeping civil justice affordable in the 21st 
century.   
This paper is organized as follows. In the first chapter, an economic dispute resolution 
model is developed that serves as the core of the economic analysis presented in this paper. 
Thereafter, the various dimensions of the access to civil justice that are relevant from a policy 
point of view, are determined. In chapter two till four, respectively cost shifting, fee 
arrangements and legal expenses insurance are researched for their effects on each of these 
                                                 
3 Ministerraad (2003) at 1.  
4 The judgments of the Belgian Supreme Court are available at <http://www.cass.be>.  
5 Lamon (2006) at 12 (interpreting the final judgment of the Supreme Court in the most evolutionary way).  
6 Corboy (1976) at 27-28.  
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dimensions, both from an economic and empirical perspective. The final chapter concludes 
with a brief comparative overview of our findings.     
 
 
 
I. Civil Justice Disentangled  
 
In this chapter, first, the chronology of a civil dispute is analyzed from an economic point of 
view. For that purpose, we rely on the standard economic theory of litigation as derived by, 
among others, Landes (1971), Gould (1973) and Posner (1973)7. In a second section, the 
various dimensions of the access to civil justice are determined, that should be distinguished 
in order to be able to properly assess the effects alternative funding options have on the 
accessibility of civil justice.    
 
 
I.1. Economic Dispute Resolution Model  
 
Basically, the chronology of a civil dispute falls apart in five different stages8. Given the 
economic approach upheld in this paper, the actors in each of these stages are assumed to be 
‘rational’. That is, they are forward looking and behave deliberatively and consistently so as 
to maximize their expected utility9,10. Therefore, contrary to the traditional legal approach, the 
first stage of the economic dispute resolution model does not take a breach of a rule of 
substantive law as a starting point, but includes all behavior, irrespective of whether it 
constitutes a breach of civil law or not. This makes sense, for all behavior with respect to the 
law is assumed to be in anticipation of legal proceedings that might follow. An agent’s 
conduct in the first stage of the model is thus assumed to be the result of trading off expected 
costs and benefits of every possible conduct and finally, choosing that particular behavior that 
he expects will maximize his personal welfare.   
At the filing stage, a person (plaintiff) that in the first stage suffered by another actor’s 
behavior (defendant) that was allegedly in violation of the law, decides whether or not to 
bring suit. The latter is here interpreted as the filing of a claim, either officially (registering 
the case at the court’s office) or informally (private communication between the parties). 
Once again, underlying this decision is a cost-benefit calculus. In this respect, it’s of 
fundamental importance to understand that since bringing suit is costly – it uses plaintiff’s 
time and/or money – a plaintiff will only file suit, if and only if, he has a credible threat 
thereafter to go to trial. In principle, this will only be the case if the claim’s expected value is 
                                                 
7 For a comprehensive overview of the basic theory of litigation, including some illustrative mathematical 
examples, see Shavell (2004) at 389-418. See also Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989). The economic model developed 
in this chapter relies heavily on this literature.  
8 The chronology of a civil dispute as presented in this section and applied throughout this paper is, of course, 
only a simplification of reality. Notwithstanding the fact that the different stages of the dispute resolution process 
are presented here as if they are strictly consecutive, in practice, typically considerable overlap occurs. The 
parties are assumed to view a dispute solely as a financial matter. Also, the model abstracts from the possibility 
of alternative dispute resolution. See on alternative dispute resolution, Shavell (1995).    
9 Ulen (1999) at 791-92. 
10 If not stated differently, parties are assumed to be risk-neutral and thus to evaluate an uncertain prospect by its 
expected value, i.e. by discounting possible outcomes by their probabilities.  
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positive, that is, when the expected judgment (the potential award multiplied by the 
probability of success11) exceeds the expected cost12. In absence of such a credible threat in 
the defendant’s view, the latter won’t fear trial and would consequentially refuse to concede 
anything at all during settlement negotiations.     
These settlement negotiations will only follow insofar as the claim is not dropped. At the 
drop stage, the plaintiff revaluates the expected costs and benefits of pursuing his claim on the 
basis of the information that has become available after suit was brought. If it turns out that 
the claim’s expected value is no longer positive, he will, in principle13, rationally decide to 
drop it.  
If the plaintiff didn’t abandon his case, settlement negotiations are supposed to follow. 
Indeed, insofar as legislation and courts don’t encourage – if not require – parties to 
endeavour settlement, the risk, expected costs and length of trial induce most parties to try to 
resolve their dispute amongst one another. A prerequisite to a successful bargain is the 
existence of a positive settlement range (and corresponding settlement surplus). That is a 
range of potential settlement amounts that leave both parties better off than they would be if 
they went to trial. This implies that the plaintiff gets at least his estimate of the expected 
judgment, net of expected litigation costs, and the defendant is due at the most his estimate of 
the expected judgment, plus expected litigation costs14. The difference between both parties’ 
threat values is the settlement surplus: it equals the sum of both parties’ litigation costs minus 
the amount by which the plaintiff’s estimate of the expected judgment exceeds the 
defendant’s15. Whether, if the cooperative surplus is positive, settlement actually occurs, 
depends on the nature of bargaining between the parties and the information they have about 
each other16.  
In the fifth and final stage, suits which didn’t settle are adjudicated by a court 
(adjudication). In course of trial proceedings, each party will rationally spend on litigation up 
to the point where an additional investment increases the expected judgment by no more than 
its expected cost, i.e. the point where the expenditure’s marginal cost equals its marginal 
benefit.  
 
 
                                                 
11 See infra text accompanying note 19.  
12 There is an important exception to this rule: in some cases, it may well be rational for a plaintiff to bring suit 
although the expected judgment would be outweighed by its costs if the judicial process were to be completed 
instantly. For a comprehensive overview of the existing theories on these ‘negative-expected-value suits’, see 
Bebchuk (1998). Our analysis abstracts from this possibility and assumes that a claim is only brought if it has a 
positive expected value, see also further infra text accompanying note 20.   
13 See supra previous note.  
14 As trial costs are typically much greater than settlement costs, for simplicity both parties’ settlement costs are 
assumed nil.  
15 Formal proof of this proposition is provided in Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) at 1075.  
16 Since Shavell (1982) and P’ng (1983) introduced respectively asymmetric information and strategic behavior 
into the analysis of settlement bargaining, the analysis has evolved from static to dynamic. For an overview of 
recent developments in modeling of pretrial settlement bargaining, see Daughety (1999), Daughety and 
Reinganum (2005). In this paper, the effect of litigation cost reallocation on the settlement rate is solely assessed 
on the basis of the existence and size of a positive settlement surplus.        
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I.2  Civil Justice: A Multi-Dimensional Concept   
 
It follows from the economic dispute resolution model that, strictly speaking, there is only one 
access to civil justice: the filing of suit. However, notwithstanding its indispensability – ‘no 
suit, no justice’ – it would be incomplete to restrict our analysis to the level of suit. First, 
because civil justice is only administrated through settlement or adjudication, and thus only 
insofar as a filed claim is not disposed of at the drop stage. Second, because (the access to) 
civil justice is a multi-dimensional concept17. It is a good that exhibits certain features, which 
all add to its overall value. On that account, rather than focusing on one single feature, a well-
established civil justice policy aims at maximizing its overall value, taking into consideration 
all of its dimensions. This holds whatever the grounds are on the basis of which this valuation 
is done.  
Therefore, in order to maximize its social bearing, the strictly positive analysis presented in 
this paper also controls for the effects of litigation cost reallocation on claim disposition, 
claim quality, the duration of claims and litigation costs18. Respectively each of these 
variables reflect one or more aspects of the access to civil justice (in a broad sense) that are 
commonly perceived as issues of social concern: the promotion of private over public dispute 
resolution, determent of meritless litigation and lowering the burden on the judicial 
administration by keeping small claims out of court, reducing delay in civil proceedings and 
the affordability of civil justice.  
As concerns claim quality, it would be most correct if it were analyzed in terms of a 
probability distribution of all possible outcomes at trial. For simplicity, however, hereafter, 
the outcome of a case is assumed dichotomous (‘all or nothing’) and its quality is evaluated in 
terms of a single amount at stake (potential award) and a single probability of success19. The 
former is assumed to be constant and to be estimated alike by both disputants. The latter 
reflects the merits of the case, i.e. its legal quality which depends on the extent to which the 
law and facts underlying the case are in support of the claim.  
Finally, before we turn to the core of this essay, one last caveat should be made. As in this 
paper the level of suit is analyzed from the viewpoint of the accessibility of justice, the 
indirect effect litigation cost reallocation has on future-defendants’ ex-ante behavior is 
exogenous to the analysis. The level of suit is determined solely by taking into account a 
claim’s expect value and the extent to which an alternative funding option allows a plaintiff to 
overcome potential risk aversion and liquidity constraints20. The possibility that a change in 
the accessibility of justice leads future-defendants to cause less conflictuous situations in the 
                                                 
17 See also Zuckerman (2002).  
18 As civil justice implies the correct application of the law to the facts of the case, accuracy of dispute resolution 
qualifies for a dimension of the access to civil justice too. Nevertheless, given the limited scope of this paper, 
accuracy is not included in the analysis as it fits least the empirical approach of this paper. It does not really 
allow for empirical testing due to the lack of a good proxy for the rectitude of adjudication, see Botero et al. 
(2003) at 75-76. For some basic insights into how litigation cost reallocation may affect the accuracy of dispute 
resolution, see Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) at 1087-88.          
19 Multiplying both gives the expected judgment, see supra text accompanying note 11.  
20 See also supra note 12.  
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first stage of the economic model, thus affecting the likelihood of suit, is not taken into 
account. Level of suit should here thus be interpreted as the probability that a given claim is 
brought.   
 
 
 
II. Cost Shifting 
 
Before the Belgian Supreme Court’s judgments of February 28, 2002, September 2, 2004 and 
May 5, 2006, it was traditionally accepted that in Belgium, such as in the US, each party to a 
civil dispute had to bear his own attorney and expert costs, irrespective of the outcome at trial. 
However, other litigation costs such as court fees were already before subject to a cost-
shifting rule. As a matter of fact, at least from a theoretical point of view, indemnity of 
litigation costs is a basic principle of Belgian civil procedure. From times immemorial, Article 
1017 of the Belgian Code of Civil Procedure says that the party ruled against is ordered to pay 
the costs of trial. Attorney and expert costs were, and still are according to many, the big 
exception to this rule. In practice, they account for the largest part of litigation costs21, but are 
not included in Article 1018 of the Belgian Code of Civil Procedure and have thus, as far as 
the letter of the law concerns, to be born by each party itself22. However, as explained in the 
introduction, the Supreme Court appears to have gradually extended the application of the 
basic principle of indemnity to attorney and expert costs.  
If follows from this overview that cost shifting need not be a matter of black or white. Costs 
can be shifted in one area of civil law, but born by each party itself in another. Furthermore, 
an indemnity rule’s scope can be limited to certain litigation costs or a certain amount. Its 
application can also be made conditional, for instance on the unmeritoriousness of a claim23. 
And last but not least, a cost-shifting rule may apply unilaterally in favor of one of the 
disputants.  
For the purpose of analyzing the essential effects of cost shifting on the accessibility of 
justice, however, in this chapter, the simplest cost-shifting rule one can image is taken as a 
starting point: a rule according to which the prevailing party recovers unconditionally all 
litigation costs from the unsuccessful party. This rule is referred to as the English rule since 
litigation costs are commonly shifted in England. If each party bears his own expenses, 
hereafter, this is referred to as the American rule.        
 
 
II.1.  Greater Trial Expenditures  
 
A preponderant effect of cost shifting is that it leads parties to incur greater litigation costs 
(greater expenditures effect). Recall that from a party’s viewpoint, trial expenditure is optimal 
                                                 
21 For an empirical study of the costs of civil litigation in Australia, see Williams and Williams (1994).  
22 However, the rechtsplegingsvergoeding (‘indemnity for legal proceedings’) in Article 1018 of the Belgian 
Code of Civil Procedure is meant to cover the costs of material acts performed by lawyers. As we speak, the 
basic tariff of this compensation does not exceed the amount of €50.   
23 Courts have interpreted US Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 as an example of such a rule. For an economic 
analysis of Rule 11, see Bebchuk and Chang (1996).   
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where its marginal cost equals its marginal benefit24. It is generally accepted, that the private 
optimal level of trial expenditure is higher under the English rule because of two reasons25. 
First, the stakes of trail are higher as the court judgment also applies to the parties’ litigation 
costs. Therefore, cost shifting increases the marginal benefit of an additional investment in 
litigation. The marginal cost, on the other hand, is lower under the English rule as each 
litigant only expects to bear his legal expenses insofar as he loses at trial.  
Such as most of the effects discussed in this chapter, also the greater expenditures effect has 
been empirically verified using data collected from the State of Florida’s adoption of a cost-
shifting rule during the period 1980-85 in an effort to restrain the growth in medical 
malpractice litigation26. In accordance with the above analysis, Snyder and Hughes 
(1990:374) found that the English rule leads to an increase in defense expenditures of 108 pct 
and 150 pct for respectively litigated and settled claims.   
It should be noted, that in practice, restrictions on the recovery of litigation costs mitigate 
this greater expenditures effect. In England, cost awards are limited to a reasonable level27. In 
Germany, the Bundesrechtsanwaltsgebührenordnung (BRAGO), the system of attorney fee 
regulation, is binding for cost-shifting purposes28.  
 
 
II.2.  Level of Suit, Settlement and Adjudication – Claim Selection   
 
II.2.1.  Level of Suit 
 
II.2.1.1. Positive and Negative Effects  
 
The effects of the English rule on the level of suit can be best explained taking those 
conditions as a starting point in which the applicable cost-allocation rule doesn’t matter. That 
is when, first, the plaintiff thinks he has a fifty-fifty chance of prevailing at trial, second, both 
parties are expected to spend the same amount on litigation, third, the English rule does not 
lead to greater trial expenditures, and fourth, the plaintiff is risk-neutral. If these four 
conditions are met, a claim’s expected value is equal under either cost-allocation rule29.  
If now one of these four conditions is relaxed, it’s quite straightforward to see how this 
affects the decision to file suit. If the plaintiff thinks he has a better than even chance of 
success, under the American rule, he still expects to bear his own expenses. Under the English 
rule, however, he expects most of the time to recover his own expenses while he only expects 
to bear the defendant’s a minority of times. Hence, the English rule increases a claim’s 
expected value along with the probability of suit30. Obviously, the opposite is true if the 
plaintiff is pessimistic about his prospects at trial.  
                                                 
24 See supra section I.1, final stage of the economic dispute resolution model.  
25 Braeutigam et al. (1984) at 180-81; Hause (1989) at 166; Katz (1987) at 159-61.  
26 For a comprehensive overview of the empirical literature on cost shifting, see Kritzer (2002) at 1946-61.  
27 Hughes and Snyder (1998) at 51. 
28 Kilian (2003) at 42.  
29 See also Snyder and Hughes (1990) at 349. 
30 Shavell (1982) at 59-60. 
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Differences between the parties’ expenditure on litigation may either reinforce or weaken 
the abovementioned effects. If all other conditions are met and the plaintiff expects to 
outspend the defendant, the plaintiff is more likely to bring suit under the English rule. For 
then the plaintiff expects to bear half of both parties’ legal cost, which is by definition less 
than his own expenses he has to pay under the American rule31. Conversely, the opposite is 
true if the plaintiff expects to be the one outspended. It should be noted that limitations on 
cost awards constrain the parties’ ability to use this effect for strategic purposes by 
threatening to incur large legal costs32.  
All other things being equal, the English rule’s increased expenditures effect lowers a 
claim’s expected value and thus discourages the filing of claims relative to the American 
rule33. 
Finally, if risk aversion34, the most common attitude towards risk, is introduced into the 
analysis, we first should note that the general effect of the plaintiff’s risk aversion is to reduce 
the likelihood of suit, for engaging in a lawsuit involves uncertainty and thus costs of risk35. 
The English rule exaggerates this effect. For relative to the American rule, the variability in 
the plaintiff’s position as between prevailing at trial or not is greater, as it also includes both 
parties’ litigation costs36. The greater expenditures effect further aggravates this effect.   
As the afore-mentioned effects are contingent on various factors (e.g., initial distribution of 
claim quality, plaintiff-to-defendant expected litigation cost ratio, magnitude of the greater 
expenditures effect, etc.), it’s theoretically impossible to determine the ultimate effect of the 
English rule on the level of suit. What is, however, possible, is to derive certain conclusions 
as to the average quality of the claims that will be pursued under either cost-allocation rule.  
 
II.2.1.2. Claim Selection  
 
Indemnity of litigation costs encourages, by means of the first of the above effects, the filing 
of high-merit claims. Under the American rule, what counts is that the expected judgment is 
sufficiently large to offset the plaintiff’s litigation costs. As a result, even an entirely 
legitimate claim with a 100 pct probability of success may have a negative expected value. 
Under the English rule, the probability of success is also the probability that the plaintiff 
doesn’t bear any litigation costs, and is therefore particularly decisive to the decision whether 
to pursue a claim or not. Provided that the chances of success are sufficiently high the 
possibly low potential award is of practically no account under the English rule37. However, it 
                                                 
31 Hause (1989) at 167-68; Snyder and Hughes (1990) at 349.  
32 Snyder and Hughes (1990) at 349n11.  
33 Hause (1989) at 167-68; Snyder and Hughes (1990) at 351-52. 
34 For a risk-averse person uncertainty itself is undesirable. Whereas a risk-neutral person only cares about the 
expected value (see supra note 10), a risk-averse person also cares about the uncertainty it involves. For the 
remainder of the analysis, it’s important to understand that the higher the variability of the possible payoffs, the 
higher the degree of uncertainty is, and the more a risk-averse person is willing to pay to reduce or eliminate the 
uncertainty involved (risk-premium).           
35 Shavell (1982) at 61. 
36 Id. at 62.  
37 Shavell (1982) at 59; Rosenberg and Shavell (1985) at 5-6.  
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follows from the analysis in the previous section, that small but strong claims will not be 
encouraged relative to the American rule, if the plaintiff expects to be outspended at trial by 
the defendant to a sufficiently large extent. Also, the greater expenditures effect and increased 
cost of risk may keep small but strong claims from being promoted by the English rule38.    
Conversely, cost shifting discourages the filing of weak claims. Insofar as the probability of 
success is sufficiently low, this includes claims with a relatively high potential award39. This 
effect is aggravated by the greater expenditures effect, the increased cost of risk, and even 
further insofar as the defendant is expected to outspend the plaintiff at trail40.  
Inherent to the English rule is thus a selection effect, that in principle promotes the filing of 
strong claims, even if they have a relatively low potential award, and discourages the filing of 
weak claims, even if they have a relatively high potential award. But as the increased 
litigation risk, the greater expenditures effect and/or the defendant’s outspending rises, the 
plaintiff will apply a higher probability of success and/or potential award threshold below 
which he won’t file any claim. This may lead him to file only highly meritorious claims with 
a high potential award41.  
This selection effect knows some restrictions. First, it won’t prevent plaintiffs of low wealth 
from filing weak claims as they cannot afford – and thus won’t fear – paying the opposing 
party’s litigation costs (judgment proofness)42. Second, it’s based on subjective quality 
measures, as it essentially relies on claim quality as perceived by the plaintiff. However, as he 
might be held liable for the defendant’s litigation costs, under the English rule, the plaintiff 
has the rational incentive to screen claims more carefully43. Also, the 8.2 pct increase of the 
probability of a plaintiff win found by Hughes and Snyder (1995:238) is consistent with a 
selection effect based on ‘objective’ legal quality being inherent to cost shifting44.   
 
 
II.2.2.  Level of Adjudication 
 
To determine the ultimate effect of the English rule on the level of adjudication, first its effect 
on the rate at which claims are respectively dropped and settled should be analyzed.     
 
II.2.2.1.  Drop Rate 
 
Both the decisions to bring suit and to drop a claim are taken on the basis of one and the same 
criterion: a claim’s expected value. Consequentially, the effects of the English rule at both 
stages of the dispute resolution model are the same. However, whether and to what extent the 
English rule will have a systematic effect on the drop rate depends on two factors.  
                                                 
38 Hause (1989) at 167-68; Snyder and Hughes (1990) at 349-52. 
39 Shavell (1982) at 59; Rosenberg and Shavell (1985) at 5-6. 
40 Snyder and Hughes (1990) at 349-52. 
41 See also id. at 349. 
42 This was empirically observed in the Alaska’s Rule 82 Study, see Di Pietro et al. (1995) at 101.   
43 Mause (1969) at 32.  
44 ‘Objective’ as perceived by judges and juries.  
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First, how good an estimation has been made of all relevant information at the time the 
claim was brought, thereby taking into account the applicable cost-allocation rule. This is 
important as weak claims that haven’t been brought under the English rule, can’t be dropped 
anymore at a latter stage.  
Second, insofar as the cost-allocation rule has systemically been taken into account at the 
filing stage, the effect at the drop stage further depends on the nature of the information which 
becomes available after suit was brought, and more in particular, how this information relates 
to the effects of the English rule on a claim’s expected value. New information on the 
defendant’s trial expenditures may either increase (he is expected to spend more than initially 
was assumed) or decrease (he is expected to spend less) the plaintiff’s expected litigation 
costs along with the likelihood that a claim is dropped relative to the American rule. As it is 
impossible to know what type of information will become available after suit was brought, it’s 
in this case theoretically impossible to determine the ultimate effect the English rule will have 
on the drop rate45.  
In the alternative case, if the English rule was not systematically taken into account at the 
filing stage, the theory applicable to the filing decision applies also to the decision to drop a 
claim.   
Snyder and Hughes (1990:364) found that the English rule increases the drop rate by 10.4 
pct. They explain the magnitude of the effect by the fact that given low filing costs, plaintiffs 
file suit without carefully ascertaining its quality, but with the purpose of collecting further 
information46. Consistent with the alternative hypothesis of our theory, the actual claim 
selection rather occurs at the drop than at the filing stage, where, as a result, the English rule 
has most of its effect. The ultimate effect itself, a 10.4 pct decrease in drop rate, is consistent 
with the specific claim selection hypothesis we’ve developed above47, according to which the 
greater expenditures effect, the increased litigation risk and/or the defendant’s outspending 
lead the plaintiff to only continue claims which combine a high probability of success with a 
relatively large potential award. Clearly, the determent of weak claims by the English rule is 
far from compensated by the promotion of strong but small claims. In Hughes and Snyder 
(1995) both scholars have further extended the empirical evidence in support of this 
hypothesis.   
 
II.2.2.2.  Settlement Rate  
 
The various effects of the English rule on parties’ settlement behavior do not point uniformly 
in one consistent direction. Therefore, it’s theoretically impossible to determine its ultimate 
effect on the settlement rate.  
First, recall that the settlement surplus equals the sum of both parties’ litigation costs minus 
the amount by which the plaintiff’s estimate of the expected judgment exceeds the 
                                                 
45 Contra Snyder and Hughes (1990) at 376n48 (apparently not taking account of the positive effects the English 
rule may have on a claim’s expected value).   
46 Snyder and Hughes (1990) at 377.  
47 See supra text accompanying note 41.  
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defendant’s48. We also already know that the English rule induces parties to incur greater 
litigation costs. It follows thus that by means of the greater expenditures effect the English 
rule tends to increase the settlement surplus along with the likelihood of settlement. The 
intuition behind this is that settlement becomes more attractive as it offers the parties the 
option to eliminate any possibility that they have to bear the increased costs of trial49. In 
addition, the English rule encourages risk-averse parties more to settle, as cost shifting 
increases the uncertainty of proceeding to trial50.   
On the other hand, the English rule also tends to discourage settlement as it’s conducive to 
the ‘relative optimism effect’51. Parties are – and do have the tendency in real life to be52 – 
relatively optimistic if the plaintiff beliefs he has a better chance of winning than the 
defendant thinks is correct. As we’ve assumed the potential award to be estimated alike by 
both parties53, this effect increases the amount by which the plaintiff’s estimate of the 
expected judgment exceeds the defendant’s – the other component of the settlement surplus. 
This way relative optimism reduces the settlement surplus and thereby the probability of 
settlement. Cost shifting magnifies this effect by making the parties’ litigation costs subject to 
the court judgment, and thus also to any difference in opinion between the parties as to the 
plaintiff’s prospects at trial. The greater expenditures effect aggravates this tendency towards 
litigation by increasing the stakes at trial even further.    
Correcting for non-random selection effects, Snyder and Hughes (1990:366) estimated that 
the English rule decreases the settlement probability by 9.6 pct. This is consistent with the 
aggravation of the relative optimism effect being dominant. 
 
II.2.2.3.  Eventual Level of Adjudication  
 
From the above, both theoretical and empirical, analysis it’s impossible to derive the ultimate 
effect of the English rule on the eventual level of adjudication. Empirically, Snyder and 
Hughes (1990:364) found that cost shifting decreases the probability that any filed claim is 
adjudicated by 5 pct. As we already know that the effect of the English rule on the parties’ 
settlement behavior accounts for an estimated 9.6 pct increase in litigation probability, it 
follows that the ultimate decrease of the adjudication rate is the result of a changed selection 
of claims reaching the settle-versus-litigate stage. More in particular, correcting for behavioral 
effects, the English rule increases the settlement probability of a claim not dropped by 16.6 
pct54. It appears thus that under a cost-shifting rule plaintiffs are more likely to drop claims 
that otherwise would have been litigated55. Also this can be seen as empirical evidence of the 
selection effect we’ve attributed to the English rule. For claims that would’ve been litigated 
                                                 
48 See supra text accompanying note 15.  
49 Bowles (1987) at 177-81; Hause (1989) at 167.  
50 Shavell (1982) at 68. See also supra text accompanying note 36. 
51 Shavell (1982) at 65-66; Katz (1987) at 157-59. 
52 See the empirical study by Loewenstein et al. (1993).  
53 See supra section I.2, claim quality.  
54 Snyder and Hughes (1990) at 366. 
55 Id. at 365, 376-77.  
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under the English rule are likely to be weak, as these claims don’t have much chance of being 
settled – the defendant wouldn’t fear trial since he has a high chance of prevailing and thereby 
of recovering litigation costs.       
 
 
II.3.  Duration of Claims  
 
II.3.1.  Dropped Claims 
 
A claim that turns out relatively weak, will be dropped at the point in time where its expected 
value falls below zero. This proposition holds irrespective of the applicable cost-allocation 
rule. What does, however, vary with the applicable cost-allocation rule, is the rate at which a 
claim’s expected value falls over time. Under the American rule, information on the lower 
than initially estimated expected probability of success only decreases the expected judgment, 
while under the English rule, it also increases the plaintiff’s expected litigation costs. 
Consequentially, as step by step a claim’s relative weakness is revealed to the plaintiff, each 
step the claim’s expected value is affected more badly under the English rule. As a result, a 
weak claim’s expected value falls faster under the English rule, which therefore induces 
plaintiffs to drop their claim rather sooner than later relative to the American rule56.     
This hypothesis has been empirically confirmed by Hughes and Savoca (1997:269).  
 
 
II.3.2.  Settled Claims 
 
Hughes and Savoca (1997:269) also found that the English rule shortens duration of settled 
claims. This result can be explained as follows. As we’ve demonstrated above, under the 
English rule the plaintiff is more likely to proceed to the settle-versus-litigate stage with 
claims of which he thinks have a high probability of success57. Further, the fact of settlement 
indicates that the parties were not relatively optimistic to a prohibitively large extent. 
Obviously, the defendant agreed to a certain extent on the plaintiff’s prospects at trial. This 
implies that he was aware of the relative weakness of his threat to go to trial. The plaintiff, on 
the other hand, will be less hesitant to proceed to trial and to incur large legal costs in course 
of that. Convinced of the strength of his case, he knows that insofar the defendant is not 
willing to reimburse his legal costs as part of a settlement, he is very likely to recoup these 
costs if he pursues the claim to judgment. Therefore, there is only one rational strategy the 
defendant can follow under the English rule, and that is, to settle the case as fast as possible. 
Otherwise, he will have to pay additionally for the plaintiff’s pretrial c.q. trial expenditures, 
either as part of a late settlement or at trial58. Insofar as a weak claim reaches the settle-
versus-litigate stage and is settled, the same reasoning applies to the plaintiff59.  
 
 
                                                 
56 Cf. Hughes and Savoca (1997) at 264-65 (reaching a similar conclusion but on different grounds).   
57 See supra text accompanying notes 47 and 55. 
58 See also Hughes and Savoca (1997) at 264-65.   
59 Bouckaert and De Mot (2005) at 303-04.  
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II.3.3.  Adjudicated Claims  
 
Finally, on theoretical grounds one may expect the English rule to lengthen the duration of 
adjudicated claims. At least, insofar as the greater expenditures parties tend to make under the 
English rule result in more extensive and time-consuming trial proceedings. Arguing that the 
fear of being held liable for both parties’ litigation costs will reduce the incentive to engage in 
costly, dilatory tactics60, doesn’t seem convincing in light of the foregoing analysis. If one or 
both parties wouldn’t feel comfortable about his chances at trial, more than under the 
American rule, the plaintiff would’ve been induced to drop his claim and the defendant to 
settle. Obviously being relatively optimistic, both parties ended up in court where they rather 
expect the opposing party to bears the costs of trial61.    
However, in the research by Hughes and Savoca (1997:269) the English rule didn’t show 
any statistical significant influence on the duration of litigated claims.    
 
 
 
III.  Fee Arrangements  
 
Thus far, attorneys were exogenous to our model. In reality, however, disputants commonly 
lack the required degree of knowledge and skill to effectively assert and defend their rights. 
Therefore they typically hire a lawyer to handle their case. Usually lawyer fees account for 
the greater part of the costs of pursuing a legal claim62. Attorney costs are thus at the core of 
the financial barrier to civil justice. On the other hand, that same observation points at the 
prospects the plaintiff-lawyer relationship might hold for bridging the funding gap.  
Today the predominant form of payment for legal services in Belgium is at an agreed hourly 
rate63. In the alternative, lawyers are paid a fee according to the value of the matter in 
controversy or, mostly in files that are not of contentious nature, a lump-sum amount. 
Although legal fees may vary with several criteria, among which the result obtained, fees only 
depending on the outcome of the case are prohibited by Article 459 of the Belgian Code of 
Civil Procedure. This implies that plaintiffs are liable for attorney costs regardless of the 
outcome of the case, thus also when no (sufficient) award has been collected to cover costs. 
Furthermore, often clients are required to pay legal fees upfront or as the case progresses.  
This contrasts sharply with US legal practice, where attorneys are allowed to take cases on a 
contingency fee basis64. In a contingency fee arrangement a lawyer agrees to a reward that 
varies with the outcome of the case in a two folded way. First, if the case is lost, the lawyer 
receives no compensation (‘no cure, no pay’). Second, if – and thus after – the case is settled 
or won, the lawyer gets a prefixed percentage of the award obtained.  
                                                 
60 Kuenzel (1963) at 80.  
61 Hughes and Savoca (1997) at 265.   
62 See, e.g., the empirical study by Williams and Williams (1994) at 79, 81-83.   
63 This is according to the information provided by the Belgian local bar associations and law firms. See, e.g., 
<http://www.advocaat.be>, <http://www.avocat.be>, <http://www.elegis.be/page.asp?id=1881&langue=EN>.         
64 For a European perspective on US contingency fee arrangements, see De Vaan (2002).        
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In Europe, these ‘extreme’ forms of performance pay are viewed with great skepticism. No 
European lawyer is allowed to make a contingency fee arrangement65. However, lately there 
are increasingly more signs that the traditional European resistance against outcome-based 
remuneration is weakening. England and Wales, for example, have adopted conditional fees 
in 199566 and in the Netherlands, contingency fees are highly debated since in February 2002 
antitrust law was successfully deployed against the no cure, no pay-prohibition in the lawyer’s 
code of conduct67. These recent developments are suggestive of the future relevance of the 
analysis provided in this chapter, which aims at highlighting how the introduction of 
contingency fee arrangements in an hourly fee system is likely to affect the accessibility of 
civil justice.  
In addition to the standard economic dispute resolution model, the analysis builds on 
principal-agent theory: the body of economic theory that treats the problems that arise when a 
principal hires an agent to act on his behalf under the dual condition of asymmetric 
information and potential conflict of interest68. Both conditions are typical to the everyday 
client-lawyer relationship. Recall that a lawyer’s better skill and knowledge of legal matters is 
the typical motivation for a client to hire a lawyer in the first place. Moreover, high 
monitoring costs are likely to prevent a client from being fully informed about his lawyer’s 
performance69. Also a potential conflict of interest is inherent to the typical client-lawyer 
relationship, as a lawyer’s interest in a case is in the fee he can earn70, while for his client the 
outcome is what matters. As will turn out below, fee arrangements have been found to be a 
response to any one or combination of the typical agency problems that arise under these 
conditions71.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
65 Article 3.3 of the CCBE-Code of Conduct for Lawyers in the European Union.   
66 A conditional fee arrangement combines no cure, no pay with an up lift of up to 100 pct over the normal fee if 
the case is successful. For an overview of the relevant economic literature, see Emons (2006) at 23-24. 
67 NMa, Case 560/87, Engelgeer, February 21, 2002 available at <http://www.nmanet.nl>. No cure, no pay was 
until recently subject of discussion in the Commission on the legal profession, see Commissie Van Wijmen 
(2006). For a first criticism on the final report, in particular on the little weight it attaches to law and economics 
arguments, see Van Almelo (2006).     
68 The terminology used here refers not to the legal concept of representation, but to a much broader concept of 
‘agency relationships’ developed in economic theory, see the seminal work by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
69 Asymmetrical information can also exist in the opposite direction, as the client is typically better informed on 
the facts underlying the case. This implies that both the lawyer and his client can act as each other’s agent (‘dual 
agency’), see Miller (1987). On the role fee arrangements can play in this respect, see Rubinfeld and Scotchmer 
(1993). The present analysis, however, abstracts from this possibility and assumes only imperfect information at 
the client’s side as to claim quality and lawyer performance.      
70 As is reflected in the traditional arguments against contingency fee agreements (e.g., they would increase the 
incentive for lawyers to provide advice which isn’t in the client’s best interest) this is not only consistent with the 
rationality assumption underlying the analysis, but also with real life, see Gravelle (1998) at 383.  
71 See also Rubinfeld and Scotchmer (1998) at 417.  
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III.1.  Level of Suit, Settlement and Adjudication – Claim Selection 
 
III.1.1. Level of Suit 
 
One of the arguments traditionally put forward against contingency fees is that they would 
stimulate ‘excessive’ litigation. Other terminology, such as ‘speculative’ and ‘frivolous’ 
litigation, is commonly used in this respect as well72. This is suggestive of the confusion these 
allegations are surrounded by. One should make a clear distinction between two different 
issues. On one hand, there is the fact that contingency fees may lead to an overall increase in 
the level of suit. On the other hand, there is the issue of claim quality, and how this is affected 
by contingency fee agreements.     
 
III.1.1.1. Positive Effects  
 
Insofar as by ‘excessive’ is meant that contingency fees may lead to an overall increase in the 
level of suit, several arguments in support of this claim can be brought forward.  
First, contingency fee agreements can be used to finance the attorney costs of pursuing a 
claim. As contingent fees are only collected after the case is closed, they allow a plaintiff in 
fact to borrow money from his lawyer while the case is pending. When capital markets are 
imperfect, this may allow liquidity constrained plaintiffs to bring suit where they otherwise 
wouldn’t have been able do so, insofar as they can’t afford the upfront payment of an hourly 
lawyer73.  
Second, a contingency fee arrangement essentially incorporates an insurance policy, as it 
shifts the risk of not obtaining a sufficient award to cover attorney costs from the plaintiff to 
his lawyer. Insofar as the plaintiff is risk-averse, he will bear less costs of risk and is thus 
more likely to bring suit74. Also, the overall cost of risk born by the plaintiff and his lawyer 
will be lower, as lawyers can diversify their portfolio of cases, which is very likely to make 
them less risk-averse than their clients75. Since an hourly fee arrangement allocates both the 
entire cost and proceed risk to the client, it does not allow for these risk-sharing benefits to be 
produced76.  
Although these effects have all a positive influence on the level of suit, they are no 
sufficient ground to conclude that the introduction of contingency fees would lead to an 
overall increase in the level of suit. If there is no excess capacity in the market for legal 
services, the opposite may occur. For some cases that would’ve been taken before on an 
hourly fee basis may be replaced in lawyers’ portfolios by cases that on a contingent fee basis 
are more lucrative. Insofar as more time is spent on these new cases than on the hourly fee 
                                                 
72 See, e.g., Olson (1991), Bernstein (1996).  
73 Rhein (1982) at 155-56; Shrager (1985).  
74 Posner (1986) at 534.  
75 See Gravelle (1998) at 383.       
76 For a more extensive analysis, see id.  
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cases before77, this will reduce the number of cases that can be handled in a same period of 
time along with the level of suit, at least in the short run. However, as it is generally accepted 
that there is an oversupply of legal services, this is not likely to occur in Belgium.   
It should be noted that the magnitude of the ultimate effect essentially depends on the 
contingency percentage lawyers work for78. As a contingent fee, in principle79, only covers 
attorney costs, it follows from the economic dispute resolution model that a plaintiff will only 
bring suit if his share in the expected judgment exceeds the remaining expected litigation 
costs. Not only the plaintiff’s share, but also the expected judgment itself varies with the 
agreed contingency percentage, as this affects the effort a lawyer devotes to a case80.   
 
III.1.1.2. Claim Selection  
 
At first sight, the economic dispute resolution model seems to confirm the common allegation 
that contingency fees encourage meritless litigation. Consider the cost-benefit calculus a 
plaintiff with an unmeritorious claim faces: insofar as the case would be successful, he 
expects a positive payoff equal to his share in the joint winnings; if the case is lost, he doesn’t 
expect any payoff, neither positive nor negative81. If follows that even the smallest chance of 
success is sufficient for a plaintiff to make it worthwhile to bring suit under a contingent fee 
agreement. Thus one would indeed expect that if contingency fees were allowed the judicial 
system would be overrun by unmeritorious lawsuits, but for one crucial aspect we’ve been 
neglecting up to now: ‘it takes two to dance the tango’.  
The key question is whether a contingency lawyer would accept the type of cases at hand. 
There seems little to no reason to answer this question positively. As a contingency lawyer 
has a direct financial stake in the outcome of the case, he will rationally decline weak claims. 
Given their low probability of success, he won’t expect them to have a sufficiently high return 
to cover the opportunity cost of his time82. That is, not only the plaintiff’s, but also his 
lawyer’s expected value of the case need be positive. The better expertise lawyers typically 
possess pleads in defense of contingency fees as well. Together with part of the litigation risk, 
a contingency fee agreement shifts the primary screening function to the lawyer, who will do 
a much more effective job than his client83. This selection effect has been empirically verified 
by Kritzer (1997:26-28), who confirms the role of contingency lawyers as gatekeepers in the 
civil justice system: generally they turn down at least as many cases as they accept, more 
often because potential clients do not have a basis for their case (i.e. low legal quality). Not 
                                                 
77 It is not unrealistic that more time would be spent on contingency fee cases: Kritzer et al. (1985:267) found for 
cases above $30,000 that if there would’ve been any significant difference between the hours spent on a case, it 
was that contingency lawyers put in more time than lawyers paid an hourly fee.   
78 See infra text subsequent to note 98.  
79 Kritzer (1998a:270), however, notes that while in many US states clients are liable for expenses regardless of 
the outcome of a case, the reality is that lawyers who pursue a case unsuccessfully on a contingency fee basis 
seldom collect those expenses or even seek to collect them. 
80 See infra text accompanying notes 95 and 96.  
81 For sake of the argument, we abstract from all other litigation costs, except for legal fees.   
82 Dana and Spier (1993) at 349-50. See also Miceli (1994).   
83 Clermont and Currivan (1987) at 571-72.  
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surprisingly, however, also lack of adequate damages (i.e. low potential award) accounts for a 
smaller proportion of cases declined.  
These findings redirect attention to the question how the prospect of an hourly fee affects a 
lawyer’s incentive to screen cases. This caused Helland and Tabarrok (2003:529-36) to 
examine whether legal quality is lower under contingency or hourly fees. Their empirical 
findings confirm what the foregoing analysis implicitly suggests: hourly lawyers have less of 
an incentive than contingency lawyers to give plaintiffs unbiased assessments of the quality of 
their claim84. As a matter of fact, concerns for reputation aside, since an hourly lawyer’s 
reward is not contingent on the outcome of the case, it would be no more than rational for him 
to pursue a frivolous claim when he has uncommitted time85. For this way he can charge for 
time that would otherwise produce no income.  
A defendant doesn’t have to select claims; he has no choice but to defend himself when 
sued. Therefore an hourly lawyer’s skewed incentives in this respect generate probably fewer 
distortions at the defendant’s than at the plaintiff’s side. This could explain why contingent 
fee agreements are rarely used by defendants86.  
 
 
III.1.2. Level of Adjudication  
 
III.1.2.1. Drop Rate  
 
It follows from the previous discussion, that an hourly lawyer has little financial incentive to 
advise his client on the low expected value of what has appeared a low-quality claim. A 
contingency lawyer, on the other hand, will screen the information that has become available 
after suit was brought more carefully, and only continue cases that have a sufficiently high 
expected return87,88. As a result we expect more claims to be dropped by a contingency 
lawyer, than on the advice of an hourly lawyer (screening effect). 
However, it should also be taken into account that under hourly fees the selection of claims 
reaching the drop stage is likely to be of lower average quality. As we’ve discussed before, an 
hourly lawyer has also a weaker incentive to screen claims at the filing stage and will thus let 
more low-quality claims proceed to the drop stage. While we don’t expect him to inform his 
client on this low quality at the drop stage either, it’s not unrealistic that some of these low-
                                                 
84 Dana and Spier (1993).  
85 Uncommitted time also affects a contingency lawyer’s incentives: it decreases the opportunity cost of his time, 
so he will accept cases with a lower expected value. But as he gets only rewarded a percentage of the recovery, 
he will invest time in more low potential award claims and/or complex but meritorious cases that require more 
work, rather than in meritless claims that have almost no chance of recovery. This is also observed in practice, 
see De Vaan (2002).  
86 Dana and Spier (1993) at 351. In line with common practice and for simplicity, below, the defendant’s 
attorney is assumed to work on an hourly fee basis.  
87 When a contingency lawyer decides to no longer pursue a claim, we consider this also a dropped contingency 
fee claim; thereafter, the claim may be either entirely dropped or the plaintiff may proceed on an hourly fee 
basis.  
88 Generally US attorneys may withdraw for any reason, but only when a withdrawal over a client’s objection 
has a justifiable cause legal fees are entitled. Nor the good faith belief that a case is meritless, neither the finding 
that it’s more complex or requires more time than initially was estimated, constitutes a justifiable cause, see De 
Vaan (2002). See also Becker (2004) (California law).    
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quality claims will be dropped unilaterally by the client. He will do so when, after getting to 
know more about his case as the dispute resolution process advances, at a certain point in time 
he finds out that his claim has actually a negative expected value. Given the average lower 
quality of filed claims, this is much more likely to be the case for claims brought under an 
hourly fee (selection effect)89. 
Which of both effects dominates the other is theoretically unclear.  
Empirical evidence suggests that the selection effect outweighs the screening effect. Danzon 
and Lillard (1983:363) found that contingency fee limits increase the drop rate by 5 pct90.   
 
III.1.2.2. Settlement Rate 
 
According to a first generation of models, a claim handled on a contingency fee basis is more 
likely to settle91. The usual explanation is that by settling a claim, a contingency lawyer 
secures his share of the settlement amount without having to invest the additional time that 
would be required if the case were to go to court. Therefore, he will advise92 his client to ask a 
settlement amount that is too low relative to the client’s interest93, as this increases the 
settlement surplus and thus the likelihood of settlement. On the other hand, relative to a 
contingency lawyer, an hourly lawyer will advise a higher settlement demand: if he’s neutral 
toward settlement, he will advise the optimal amount; while if he has uncommitted time, he 
will be induced to discourage settlement by advising a too high amount so he can spend more 
billable hours on the case at trial.  
A second generation of models, however, demonstrates that contingency fees may also 
create incentives for lawyers to settle cases less often, and for a higher amount than would be 
optimal for the plaintiff94. The contribution of Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2002) in this respect 
appears most influential, as it shows that the conventional analysis fails to incorporate the 
effect fee arrangements have on attorney effort. Contrary to what first generation models 
assume, contingency lawyers spend rather too little than the optimal amount of time on a case. 
The well-know explanation therefor is that under a contingent fee contract, a lawyer bears the 
full cost of his time, but obtains only a fraction of the benefits. Therefore, the level of effort 
that equates his marginal cost and marginal benefit is lower than the level that would 
maximize the claim’s expected value95. Only when a contingency lawyer internalizes the 
entire benefit of his investment he will behave optimal, that is, when his contingency 
                                                 
89 This is the hypothesis underlying the empirical strategy adopted by Helland and Tabarrok (2003:521).  
90 It remains unclear whether Helland and Tabarrok (2003) were able – or at least tried – to correct for the 
screening effect. No doubt they were familiar with the effect, see id. at 522n7 (discussing Dana and Spier 
(1993)).     
91 Schwartz and Mitchell (1970), Miller (1987), Thomason (1991), Gravelle and Waterson (1993). 
92 In an attempt to correct for potential conflicts of interest, the law usually gives settlement authority to the 
client, see Miller (1987) at 190.  
93 The optimal (settlement) amount from the plaintiff’s perspective is the amount that would be chosen by a 
perfectly knowledgeable plaintiff – one who doesn’t face any asymmetrical information, neither as to legal 
matters, nor as to lawyer performance – who pays his lawyer by the hour.  
94 Miceli (1994), Bebchuk and Guzman (1996), Rickman (1999), Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2002).  
95 Schwartz and Mitchell (1970) at 1135-36. See, however, Danzon (1983) (showing that under certain specific 
conditions contingency lawyers’ effort incentives are optimal).    
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percentage is no less than 100 pct96. Once this is taken into account, as Polinsky and 
Rubinfeld (2002:222-224) demonstrate, it may be rational for a contingency lawyer’s 
settlement demand to be higher than would be optimal, resulting in too little settlements 
occurring.  
Empirical evidence seems only to confirm Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2002) and the other 
second generation models in their approach. Danzon and Lillard (1983:363) found that 
contingency fee limits decrease settlement amounts by 9 pct and increase the settlement rate 
by 1.5 pct. Also Snyder and Hughes (1990:366) found that contingency fee limits encourage 
the parties to settle their dispute. This could be explained as if contingency lawyers have on 
average an even stronger incentive than their hourly fee counterparts to raise settlement 
demand, thus reducing settlement probability.  
 
III.1.2.3. Eventual Level of Adjudication  
 
Due to hourly lawyers’ weaker incentives to screen cases for their true quality at the filling 
stage, the drop rate of claims handled on an hourly fee basis is higher. Also, the number of 
settled claims was found to be higher for hourly fee cases. As a result, claims brought under 
an hourly fee are less likely to be adjudicated. Consistent herewith, Snyder and Hughes 
(1990:360) found that contingency fee limits reduce the probability that a filed claim proceeds 
to adjudication.       
 
 
III.2. Attorney Costs  
 
Fee setting may affect a plaintiff’s attorney costs as well as the overall price level in the 
market for legal services. Further, the susceptibility of attorney costs for lawyer opportunism 
varies with the applicable fee arrangement. Below, each of these effects of contingency fees 
on attorney costs is examined, both from a lawyer’s and plaintiff’s perspective.  
 
 
III.2.1. Lawyer’s Perspective 
 
Given the additional, costly finance and insurance services a contingency lawyer provides, he 
will rationally demand to do better on average than his hourly fee counterparts97. This is also 
observed in practice. Contingency fees yield higher average effective hourly rates (the per 
hour return for the time a lawyer devotes to a case) than hourly fees98.   
Further, the nature of competition will determine the price at which contingency lawyers 
sell their services. This is apparent from the comparison of Schwartz and Mitchell (1970) and 
Danzon (1983). Both assume risk-neutrality and perfect competition, but where in the former 
                                                 
96 This is why, if attorney effort is entirely unobservable, a fee arrangement in which the attorney buys the rights 
to the client’s legal claim would be most optimal. Such a fee arrangement is, however, prohibited in most US 
states. See further Santore and Viard (2001).   
97 By “hourly fee counterparts” here is meant lawyers with the same quality, experience, etc. but who are paid at 
an hourly rate. Cf. Kritzer (1998a) at 272. 
98 Not everyone agrees, however, on how much better contingency lawyers do in practice, see infra text 
accompanying notes 115 and 116.   
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lawyers compete for cases by bidding down on the contingency percentage, the latter assumes 
competition on the basis of the client’s net recovery. As a result, their conclusions as to the 
equilibrium attorney effort and expected fee differ. Danzon (1983:216) finds equilibrium 
outcomes identical to those that would appear if lawyers were hired at an hourly rate by 
perfectly knowledgeable clients. Schwartz and Mitchell (1970:1138-39) arrive at fewer hours 
per case, lower gross recoveries and lower fees. 
As these models rely on fairly unrealistic competitive requirements, the question arises 
which part contingency fees can take in the approximation of the market for legal services to 
the ideal of perfect competition. A prerequisite for competition to flourish is that in addition 
to the price, consumers are also able to determine the relative quality levels so they can make 
informed price/quality trade-offs99. However, legal quality is to a large extent a credence 
good: asymmetrical information prevents most consumers from performing a reliable quality 
judgment even after legal services have been performed100. Reputation may provide some 
guidance, but this gives no more than a weak indication of the true quality of a lawyer101. 
Therefore, it’s generally accepted that to avoid the overall deterioration of quality – ‘the 
market for lemons’102 – regulation is required to ensure a minimum quality standard of legal 
services103. On top of that standard, contingency fees can contribute to the transparency of the 
market for legal services by allowing high-quality lawyers to distinguish themselves from 
low-quality lawyers. As by their very nature contingency fees result ceteris paribus in higher 
returns to high-quality lawyers, the latter can compete for cases on the basis of their quality by 
bidding down on the contingency percentage104. Also, when both contingency and hourly fees 
are combined, a lawyer can credibly signal his quality by assuming more of the risk and 
letting more of his fee depend on the outcome of the case105.   
However, there is no guarantee that consumers will effectively associate a lower 
contingency percentage with a higher quality level. It’s reasoned that consumers who are 
unable to assess quality may perceive a cut-rate price offer as signalling that more 
knowledgeable purchasers have assessed the lawyer as being of low quality106. A related 
reason why lawyers may be deterred from price undercutting is that insofar their performance 
is non-verifiable by clients, they will be expected to put less effort107. Indeed, if follows from 
what we’ve argued before, that the lower the contingency percentage, the less time a lawyer 
will devote to a case108.  
 
 
                                                 
99 Brickman (2003a) at 93.  
100 On credence goods, see Darby and Karni (1973).      
101 Copenhagen Economics (2006) at 9.  
102 Ackerlof (1970).  
103 Stephen (2001) at 2.  
104 Kerkmeester (1999) at 260.      
105 Rubinfeld and Scotchmer (1993).  
106 Brickman (2003a) at 100-01; Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (2006) at 11 (citing Stephen 
(2004)).  
107 Brickman (2003a) at 100-01. 
108 See supra text accompanying notes 95 and 96.  
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III.2.2. Plaintiff’s Perspective   
 
That a contingency lawyer does better on average than an hourly lawyer, does not imply that 
all of his clients pay more for legal services than they might if they paid by the hour. 
Assuming one single contingency percentage, plaintiffs who obtain no recovery don’t pay any 
legal fee, others bear some attorney costs, and finally clients who obtain a large recovery pay 
the largest fee. The latter are most likely to pay more than if they paid by the hour109. The 
difference constitutes, in principle, an interest and risk premium, which compensates the 
contingency lawyer for the additional finance and insurance services he provides110. However, 
the proportion of hourly to contingent fees in practice is much less straightforward, as they are 
both also determined by the extent to which the path is clear for lawyer opportunism.            
  
III.2.2.1. Contingency Lawyer Opportunism 
 
Clients generally have no way of knowing how strong a case they have, and that is exactly the 
reason why many choose to pay on a percentage basis. Kritzer (1998a:305) reports that clients 
almost always opt for a contingent fee when advised of even the slightest possibility of a 
downside risk. At once, this emphasizes the importance of contingency fees’ risk-sharing 
properties, but also it reveals potential grounds for lawyer opportunism. In order to maximize 
his profits, a lawyer may overstate the risk of client non-recovery and recommend a 
contingent fee where given the client’s financial position and true probability of winning, an 
hourly fee would’ve been in his best interest111. Further, a contingency percentage can be 
insisted on that is disproportionate to the actual degree of risk the representation involves112. 
Both grounds for opportunistic behavior underlie the set of binding and nonbinding rules 
imposed on US lawyers that aim at safeguarding the client’s interest in fee negotiations113. 
The final piece to this regulation is the possibility to bring a fee’s ‘reasonableness’ before the 
court, in course of which factors are taken into account such as the degree of asymmetric 
information and the actual risk of non-recovery at the time the fee arrangement was 
concluded114. 
However, at present time the effectiveness of this regulation and the reasonableness of 
contingency fees are in the eye of the US tort-and-judicial-reform storm. The actual degree of 
competition in the contingency fee market is inherent to this debate. Basically, there are two 
competing views. According to Kritzer (1998a) the returns to the contingency bar are at best 
“somewhat” better than what hourly lawyers earn; market-related mechanisms serve to bring 
down unreasonably high fees, and can be further enhanced by improving consumer 
awareness115. On the other hand, Brickman (2003b) argues that the yields of contingency 
                                                 
109 See also Kritzer (1998a) at 307.  
110 Brickman (1996) at 270.  
111 Kritzer (1998a) at 305.  
112 Halpern and Turnbull (1983) at 14.   
113 For an overview, see De Vaan (2002) (including references).   
114 Id.   
115 See also Galanter (1998), Silver (2002).   
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practice have become inordinately high and advocates a strict regulatory approach; he points 
at restrictions to price competition imposed by the bar and ethical rules that would allow 
lawyers to collusively maintain a uniform price116. The most important conclusion we can 
draw from this intense yet indecisive debate, is that the enhanced free market process we’ve 
attributed to contingency fees can117, of course, also be stifled by other factors, which inhibit 
the emergence of a competitive market, such as excessive regulation of the legal profession. 
Sure, also the market for hourly fees is susceptible to it118. And most importantly, even if 
hourly fees would allow for competition under certain restrictive practices where contingency 
fees wouldn’t119, according to Brickman (2003a:106), the risk and agency costs clients face in 
an hourly fee setting are so extensive that they didn’t allow hourly fees to compete with the 
allegedly overpriced US contingency fees.  
 
III.2.2.2. Hourly Lawyer Opportunism 
 
Indeed, also under an hourly fee arrangement clients encounter various agency problems 
which may affect attorney costs. As a matter of fact, only when he doesn’t face any 
asymmetric information a client will be able to ensure that his hourly lawyer puts the optimal 
amount of effort120. However, lack of expertise typically prevents a client from judging the 
appropriateness of the hours a lawyer claims that should be devoted to a case. If he has 
uncommitted time, an hourly lawyer will have the rational incentive to make use of this 
information asymmetry and inflate the hours a case warrants, so he can charge for time that 
would otherwise produce no income121. Recall that a contingency lawyer has the opposite 
incentive and rather invests inadequate time in a case122. The difference is, however, only 
statistically discernable for cases involving up to $6,000123. 
Furthermore, the additional time an hourly lawyer charges for does not guarantee a 
corresponding increase in expected award. Insofar as his performance is not accurately 
observable by the client, an hourly lawyer is induced to shirk and spend less time on a case 
than he bills for. Contingent fees can be used to address this moral hazard problem124, at least 
to some extent125. Also his lack of direct financial interest in the resulted obtained affects the 
way an hourly lawyer allocates his time to a case relative to a contingency lawyer. Not 
surprisingly, Kritzer et al. (1985:270-71) found that the latter is much more sensitive to the 
potential productivity of his time and less affected by craft-oriented factors. Ceteris paribus a 
                                                 
116 See also Painter (1995), Hadfield (2000).  
117 We do not argue that this is actually the case in the US; that remains unclear.  
118 Indicative is the battle against restrictive and disproportionate regulation of liberal professions the European 
Commission has engaged since February 2004, see 
<http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/prof.html>. 
119 A possible argument could be that the improved transparency contingency fees bring about, facilitates the 
maintenance of a tacit collusion as it allows for better control of the other market participants’ behavior.      
120 See supra note 93.  
121 Halpern and Turnbull (1983) at 14.   
122 See supra text accompanying note 95.  
123 Kritzer et al. (1985) at 268.  
124 Danzon (1983), Gravelle and Waterson (1993), Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2003), Emons and Garoupa (2006).  
125 See supra text accompanying notes 95 and 96.  
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plaintiff who aims at maximizing his recovery appears better off with a contingent fee, while 
someone who wants also to pursue other-than-strictly-financial goals may be better served by 
an hourly lawyer.    
 
 
III.3. Duration of Claims  
 
III.3.1. Dropped Claims  
 
It follows from our discussion on the drop rate, that a contingency lawyer rather than his 
client pulls the strings on the decision to drop a claim. When handled on an hourly fee basis, a 
claim is rather dropped on the plaintiff’s initiative. Both actors have the same incentive: they 
want to avoid spending resources on a case that is actually not worth it. However, their 
knowledge and skill to do an effective job in this respect differ. Typically the contingency 
lawyer will be much better in collecting, processing and evaluating relevant information. He 
will be capable of keeping track of the claims’ expected value on a day-to-day basis, while it 
will take the plaintiff much longer to get to, and process the relevant information. Therefore, 
it will take on average longer for claims handled on an hourly fee basis to be dropped.  
No empirical research is known to us that directly aims at measuring the impact of 
contingency fees on the duration of dropped claims. In course of their research on cost 
shifting, Hughes and Savoca (1997:271) also controlled for the effects of contingency fee 
limits on the longevity of dropped claims, but they didn’t find any statistical significant effect, 
neither with regard to settled nor adjudicated claims.    
 
 
III.3.2. Settled Claims 
 
The incentive analysis we’ve made thus far doesn’t leave much doubt about how an hourly 
lawyer will behave as to the timing of settlement. He can increase billable hours by spending 
more time round the negotiation table. Thus, insofar as the case actually gets settled and he 
has uncommitted time, he prefers it rather later than sooner. For a contingency lawyer time is 
definitely money126. Even if, as according to the second generation models127, he may have an 
insufficient incentive to settle, a contingency lawyer won’t engage in dilatory tactics as he 
can’t earn any money from it. Therefore, cases handled on a contingency fee basis will take 
shorter to settle.      
Helland and Tabarrok (2003:536-39) present empirical evidence in support of this claim.  
 
 
III.3.3. Adjudicated Claims 
 
Again, by spending more time on pre-trial and trial proceedings, an hourly lawyer can 
increase billing hours. A contingency lawyer, on the other hand, is as we know much more 
sensitive to his time and its productivity. Therefore, we expect an hourly lawyer to increase 
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the duration of adjudicated claims, for example, by calling more witnesses or asking for a 
second-opinion on an expert’s report where a contingency lawyer wouldn’t do so. However, 
as the effect of fee arrangements on lawyers’ incentives to spend time on a case was only 
found statistically discernable for cases involving up to $6,000128, the difference in duration 
between claims handled on a contingency and hourly fee basis may fade away – if not 
reverse129 – as the stakes become higher.    
Except for Hughes and Savoca (1997)130 we know of no other empirical study that has 
searched for effects of fee arrangements on the duration of adjudicated claims. 
 
 
 
IV.  Legal Expenses Insurance 
 
Legal aid schemes flourished in many western societies in the post-war era. But as its cost had 
continuously increased over time and governments in the 1990s began to lose faith in large 
public policy programs, many governments steadily reduced the expenditure on legal aid131. 
This way legal expenses insurance came into the picture, both as a complementor to and a 
partial substitute for legal aid132. Legal expenses insurance is a contract in which a private 
insurer agrees, for a premium, to cover in certain categories of cases a policyholder’s legal 
costs. In Belgium, however, the last couple of years the scope and budgetary funds of the 
legal aid system have only been further expanded, and until very recently no great pains were 
taken over the promotion of legal expenses insurance133. As a result, in comparison with 
neighbouring countries, in particular Germany134, the Belgian market for stand-alone135 legal 
expenses insurance is fairly underdeveloped at the moment. This might, however, change in 
the future as the July 2, 2006 meeting of the Cabinet has finally announced a package of 
measures to promote legal expenses insurance136.  
In this chapter we examine the essential changes in the access to civil justice we can expect, 
if the measures proposed by the Belgian government turn out successful. The fundamental 
difficulty that arises once a legal expenses insurer is introduced in our model, is that the three 
essential roles at one side of a legal dispute are filled by three different actors: the one suing, 
or getting sued (the plaintiff or defendant), is different from the one spending (his lawyer), is 
                                                 
128 See supra text accompanying note 123.   
129 See supra note 77.  
130 See supra section III.3.1 in fine.  
131 Kilian and Regan (2004) at 233. 
132 In the US, there is no developed system of legal expenses insurance. This is probably the result of 
contingency lawyers providing insurance coverage for attorney costs. Legal service plans enjoy some popularity 
in the US, but they follow different principles to legal expenses insurance, see Killian (2003) at 36-37.   
133 Since the beginning of the current period of office, legal aid expenditure has almost doubled from €25.6 
million in 2003 up to more than €43 million in 2005, see Ministerraad (2006).   
134 On legal expenses insurance in Germany, see Kilian (2003).   
135 Many people already have legal expenses insurance as an add-on to more traditional insurance policies but 
these products only provide limited coverage and most people are even not aware of the fact that they have 
coverage for legal expenses in those limited cases; therefore its real prospects for improving the access to civil 
justice lie in stand-alone legal expenses insurance, i.e. policies that are not sold in conjunction with or on top of 
any other insurance product. 
136 Ministerraad (2006) at 2-3.  
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different from the one funding (insurer). Each of these players has his own financial interest 
in the case and possesses certain private information. In the triangular client-lawyer-insurer 
nexus of contracts each relationship thus qualifies for a principle-agent relationship. 
Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the analytical framework is more complex, the 
analytical tools that are used here are essentially the same as the ones we’ve used to study the 
client-lawyer relationship.  
Legal expenses insurance policies come in many forms137. But rather than on these different 
forms, the analysis focuses on mandatory regulation and how this may affect the potential for 
legal expenses insurance to develop as an alternative means for funding the access to civil 
justice. Typically legal expenses insurance only covers part of a client’s legal costs as policies 
usually incorporate limits and deductibles in addition to exclusions. However, for sake of the 
argument, the analysis takes as a starting point a policy that provides literally full coverage. 
Any misunderstanding this could give rise to is corrected for in section IV.2 on attorney costs.      
 
 
IV.1.  Level of Suit, Settlement and Adjudication – Claim Selection  
 
IV.1.1. Level of Suit 
 
IV.1.1.1. Positive Effects  
 
There is little doubt that legal expenses insurance has positive effects on the level of suit. As a 
plaintiff holding insurance doesn’t bear any litigation costs, he won’t take these costs into 
account when assessing a claim’s expected value. Legal expenses insurance thus increases a 
claim’s expected value and the likelihood of suit138. Therefore, it may be perfectly rational for 
a risk-neutral agent to purchase legal expenses insurance, as it strengthens the credibility of 
his threat to take a dispute he’s involved in to trial139. In addition, similar to contingency fee 
arrangements140, a plaintiff with legal expenses insurance doesn’t bear any litigation cost risk. 
This way legal expenses insurance promotes the filing of suit by risk-averse plaintiffs. Also, it 
allows liquidity constrained plaintiffs to bring suit where they otherwise wouldn’t have been 
able do so141. It should be noted that the premium paid for legal expenses insurance is of no 
account to a policyholder’s rational decision to bring suit since it constitutes a sunk cost, i.e. a 
cost that has already been incurred and which cannot be recovered to any significant 
degree142.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
137 For a comprehensive overview, see Kilian (2003) at 32-35.  
138 Kirstein (2000), Van Velthoven and Van Wijck (2001).  
139 As firms may be rather risk-neutral than risk-averse, the use of insurance as a strategic device can (partially) 
explain why also firms buy legal expenses insurance, see Kirstein (2000) at 251.   
140 See supra text accompanying note 74.  
141 Van Velthoven and Van Wijck (2001). See also supra text accompanying note 73.   
142 However, it has been observed that people don’t always behave rational with respect to sunk costs, see 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Arkes and Blumer (1983).   
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IV.1.1.2. Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard  
 
In addition, the two primary agency problems in the insurer-client relationship tend to 
increase the level of suit further. Both effects, however, are rather a vice than a virtue since, 
unless the underlying information asymmetries can be properly addressed, they may cause the 
legal expenses insurance market to fail143.  
Adverse selection144 can occur when potential policyholders have different characteristics 
and/or preferences which make them more (less) likely than others to get involved in litigious 
situations. When an insurer cannot properly distinguish the different risk types and charges a 
premium based on the average risk, this will attract high-risk and deter low-risk types from 
purchasing insurance. Due to this selection effect the odds that a policyholder will get 
involved in a litigious situation and invokes his policy will be above average. Therefore, the 
insurer is likely to experience excessive losses as the premium was set according to average 
risk. In response, the insurer may increase the insurance premium, but this only compounds 
the problem and leads to an even more adversely selected group of insurance purchasers.  
Moral hazard145 refers here to tendency of insurance protection to alter a policyholder’s 
incentives to prevent the insured event from occurring146. A plaintiff holding legal expenses 
insurance may, for example, rationally have a weaker incentive to spend time and/or money 
screening future contracting parties for their reputation of being a defaulter, in the knowledge 
that he won’t bear any costs if legal actions have to be taken to secure payment147. Moral 
hazard poses, however, only a real problem if the insurer cannot observe policyholders’ 
behavioral changes so that it cannot be accounted for in advance by a requisite premium 
charge148. In that case the insurer is likely to experience excessive losses as this leaves him 
exposed to higher levels of risk than was anticipated when the premium was set. 
Experience from the Netherlands and Germany suggests that insurers succeed quite well in 
overcoming these problems. While in the period 2000-04 the number of legal expenses 
insurance policies increased rapidly in the Netherlands, the relative claim frequency (number 
of claims per 100 policies) remained practically constant149. In Germany, the total increase in 
the number of litigants as a result of being insured was shown to be only between 5 to 10 
pct150. Safeguards against adverse selection range from risk-based diversification of premiums 
to ceilings on the amount of coverage (per insurance period151), a variety of available 
                                                 
143 Bowles and Rickman (1998) at 197. 
144 See, in general, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).  
145 See Arrow (1963).  
146 Moral hazard may also increase the magnitude of the size of the pay-out, see infra text accompanying note 
185.   
147 On the rationality behind moral hazard, see Pauly (1968).   
148 See Schmidt (1961) at 89.    
149 Verbond van Verzekeraars (2005) at 26-27. See also Kerkmeester (2005) at 210.  
150 Prais (1995) at 439 (citing figures from the research funded by the German Department of Justice 
Rechtsschulzversicherung und Rechtsverfolgung (‘Legal Expenses Insurance and the Recourse to the Court’)). 
151 This may enhance the determent of high-risk types relative to low-risk types better than a ceiling per claim 
when/as the former are more likely to file several insurance claims per insurance period.    
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insurance policies combining different coverage and premium levels152 and the exclusion of 
certain risks from insurance153. To fend off moral hazard insurers tend not to offer full 
insurance, but to pass some risk back to consumers (co-insurance). The preferable form of co-
insurance to counter the type of moral hazard at hand is a deductible, which is included in 
most legal expenses insurance policies154. This requires a client to pay in full the first 
proportion of his legal costs before collecting the rest from his insurer. This not only 
encourages him to avoid litigious situations, but also cuts the insurer’s administrative costs, 
since – as apposed to co-payments155 – a client has no incentive to invoke his policy when a 
dispute only entails minor expenditures156.    
 
IV.1.1.3. Claim Selection  
 
Associated with the abovementioned positive effects is the common belief that legal expenses 
insurance causes a flood of unmeritorious litigation157. Different from contingency fees, one 
could also suspect legal expenses insurance of promoting small claims158. Basically, the line 
of reasoning that should be adopted to this issue is the same as the one we’ve developed on 
claim selection under contingency fee arrangements. From the point of view of a plaintiff with 
legal expenses insurance, the smallest chance of recovering a nutshell is a sufficient ground to 
bring suit. But then again, it’s very unlikely that a private insurer will offer coverage for any 
such claims. 
Beforehand, it should be noted that we already know that most legal expenses insurance 
policies include a deductible. This serves as a selection mechanism since a client will 
rationally only invoke his policy if the expected judgment exceeds the amount of the 
deductible159. However, this does not entirely preclude the possibility that unmeritorious suits 
are promoted and only provides a rather remote explanation.  
A more fundamental argument – separate from the problem of moral hazard – can be found 
in one of the essential requirements for a risk to be insurable, namely that an insurer must 
have a sufficient volume of business. In insurance terms this means that he must be able to 
group a sufficiently large number of policyholders in a risk-pool. This allows him to diversify 
risk and become a more efficient risk bearer – which is essential for insurance to be 
feasible160. At first sight, offering coverage for legal expenses irrespective of a claim’s 
potential award and merit seems a quite effective strategy to create a sizeable risk-pool. 
However, as we’ve argued above, this intemperate strategy will induce each policyholder to 
                                                 
152 This way policyholders may be induced to reveal their type, see Emons (1989) at 50-52 (applying this 
concept to warranty contracts).  
153 See Kilian (2003) at 39.  
154 For Germany, id. at 45.  
155 See infra text accompanying note 185.  
156 Economist (1995).  
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438; Kilian (2003) at 45.    
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rationally seize with both hands every slightest opportunity to bring suit whatever the chance 
of success and/or potential award. If then the insurer raises premiums to off-set the flood of 
insurance claims and the massive administrative costs this would entail, he will encounter 
another limitation to the insurability of a risk: only when the insurance premium is lower than 
potential clients’ risk-premium the latter will be willing to purchase insurance161. 
Consequently, after premiums have been adjusted to the excessive loss the risk-pool suffers 
under these conditions, in spite of its broad coverage, most won’t be willing to pay anymore 
for the insurance policy. As a result, insofar as some are still willing to purchase coverage, 
instead of very large, the risk-pool will be small and – insofar as it doesn’t collapse – highly 
unattractive from the insurer’s point of view. This shows that inherent to building up a 
sizeable risk-pool is a trade-off between keeping premiums at a reasonable level so as to offer 
a sensible priced product attractive to the masses and ensuring that premium income is 
sufficient to cover costs. It follows that, in general, this trade-off can most sensibly be solved 
by reducing coverage to avoid an excessive flood of claims, but to do so without 
fundamentally affecting the attractiveness of the policy. That is, excluding those claims from 
coverage for which the willingness to pay is lowest, i.e. claims with a low expected value due 
to their low potential award and/or low chance of recovery.  
That this alternative approach is the more feasible one, appears also in practice. In addition 
to a deductible, standard legal expenses insurance policies also include additional safeguards 
to counter unmeritorious litigation, such as a merits test162. Also the contractually implied 
obligation of good faith (Article 1134 of the Belgian Civil Code) allows an insurer to decline 
coverage for groundless or unreasonable claims, or because of its futility or lack of 
evidence163.  
The little empirical evidence that is available on legal expenses insurance shows that insofar 
as there is a difference between claims brought by self-financing and insured plaintiffs, it’s 
that the latter are more inclined to bring small cases. But, all in all, the difference is small164. 
It was also found that 3 pct more of the insured litigants won their case165. On the one hand, 
this could be explained by the better control insurers might have of lawyer opportunism166. On 
the other, insofar also plaintiffs were among the more successful litigants, it may be the 
reflection of a more careful case screening by insurance companies throughout the dispute 
resolution process on the basis of ‘objective’ legal quality167.  
Relative to hourly lawyers168, legal expenses insurers appear to have indeed a stronger 
incentive to screen cases more carefully before they declare coverage. Such as a contingency 
                                                 
161 On risk-premium, see supra note 34.  
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163 Colle (2005) at 305. 
164 Prais (1995) at 439.  
165 Id. 
166 See infra section IV.2.  
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lawyer, an insurer’s incentives are driven by a direct financial interest in the case, but rather in 
its legal costs than in its outcome169. It’s a market-driven incentive, in the sense that an insurer 
cannot limit coverage too much as this will make his insurance product less attractive 
compared to competing products in the market and narrow down his risk-pool. On the other 
hand, if an insurer wants to keep premiums at a competitive level and at least break even, as 
we’ve demonstrated above, coverage has to be limited to some extent and cases need to be 
screened accordingly. Therefore legal expenses insurers employ legally trained personnel to 
screen, handle and monitor legal disputes in which policyholders are involved. Thus, also an 
insurer has the required skill and knowledge to screen claims effectively.   
 
 
IV.1.2. Level of Adjudication  
 
IV.1.2.1. Drop Rate  
 
One may expect that the intensity with which an insured plaintiff will wish to continue a filed 
claim will be greater than the intensity a self-financing plaintiff will choose170. Yet, as it still 
may turn out after suit was brought and coverage was declared, that a claim lacks quality to 
such an extent that it’s legitimately no longer eligible for insurance coverage, also the insurer 
can decide to drop a claim covered by legal expenses insurance171. Moreover, as in principle 
an insurer does not have to allow the intervention of a lawyer before the case is brought to 
court172, he can handle the claim in-house, which allows him to keep better track of every 
evolution that might be relevant to his decision whether to withdraw coverage. On the other 
hand, one should take into account that claims of uninsured plaintiff’s will be handled by 
hourly lawyers, which are unlikely to give them unbiased advice on the claim’s quality both at 
the filing and drop stage. Therefore, similar to the effect of fee arrangements on the drop 
rate173, two counteracting effects determine the effect of legal expenses insurance on the drop 
rate.  
First, given the stronger incentive of insurers to screen cases for their true quality, they may 
detect more claims that no longer fit the conditions for insurance coverage, relative to the 
number of claims an hourly lawyer advises his uninsured client to no longer pursue (screening 
effect).  
Second, as hourly lawyers do also not perform their screening function as carefully as legal 
expenses insurers at the filing stage, claims of self-financing plaintiffs reaching the drop stage 
                                                                                                                                                        
uncommitted time too, since the fixed fee is payable anew in every stage of the litigation process, see Leipold 
(1995) at 271-74. 
169 However, if the English cost-allocation rule applies, the legal costs an insurer may have to reimburse depend 
directly on the outcome of the case; there is little doubt that then case screening will be performed even more 
thoroughly. See Rickman and Gray (1998) at 311.  
170 Bowles and Rickman (1998) at 197.  
171 After the insurer has withdrawn coverage, a plaintiff may either drop his claim entirely or continue his claim 
as a self-financing plaintiff.     
172 Article 4.1 (a) Directive 87/344/EC on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions 
relating to Legal Expenses Insurance, official reporter EC Nr. L 185, 4 July 1987, 77.  
173 See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.  
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will be of average lower quality. Therefore, it might be that more claims are dropped on the 
initiative of self-financing plaintiffs after they’ve discovered the true quality of their claim, 
than on the initiative of insured plaintiffs (selection effect).  
No empirical data is available to make any statement on which of both effects might 
dominate the other.  
 
IV.1.2.2. Settlement Rate 
 
Parties’ incentives to settle stem essentially from the costs of trial, which they can avoid by 
resolving their dispute among one another. This is reflected in the settlement surplus, which 
increases as the expected costs of litigation rise. But as legal expenses insurance reimburses 
an insured party’s litigation costs, it has the obvious effect of decreasing the settlement 
surplus along with the likelihood of settlement174. Further, by eliminating the litigation cost 
risk, legal expenses insurance weakens the settlement promoting effect of an insured party’s 
risk aversion. Settlement will be discouraged most if both parties to the dispute hold legal 
expenses insurance, as both their minimum acceptable settlement amount will abstract from 
the costs and uncertainty of trial.      
These conclusions, however, are incomplete in a fundamental aspect as the active role legal 
expenses insurers may play in settlement negotiations is not taken into account. In some 
jurisdictions, such as Germany, monopoly rights for lawyers limit an insurance company’s 
involvement in a case to declaring coverage and reimbursing legal expenses175. In Belgium, 
however, an insurer can reserve himself the right to take all necessary steps to get the case 
settled176. As an insurer can save costs if the case doesn’t go to court, he’s very likely to use 
this possibility to foster settlement. To that end, he might be induced to be more lenient 
towards the opposing party and thus increase the settlement probability. On the other hand, to 
some extent, this incentive is counteracted by the fact that such a leniency could negatively 
affect the attractiveness of the insurance policy, the insurer’s reputation and in turn his 
profits177. But given the client’s relative ignorance, it’s very unlikely that this will entirely 
keep the insurer’s incentive to endeavour settlement from partially offsetting the weaker 
incentive clients have to settle their dispute178.  
Empirical data confirms that legal expenses insurance discourages settlement. In Germany 
between 5 to 8 pct more litigants proceeded to trial if they were insured than if they were not 
insured179. In Belgium, however, the fact that 80 pct of all claims covered by legal expenses 
insurance are settled, is generally perceived as a clear indication that insurance companies 
                                                 
174 Kirstein (2000), Van Velthoven and Van Wijck (2001).  
175 For Germany, see Kilian (2003) at 37.  
176 Colle (2005) at 304.  
177 Van Velthoven and Van Wijck (2001) at 394n14.  
178 Heyes et al. (2004) show that also asymmetry of information between the parties may positively affect the 
settlement rate.  
179 Prais (1995) at 439. However, this data should be handled with care as it’s unclear whether it’s corrected for 
any selection effect that might have occurred at the drop stage.   
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contribute to private dispute resolution180. Unfortunately, more reliable data is not available – 
let alone empirical data that would allow to determine to what extent the different role 
insurers play in settlement negotiations affects settlement rates in Germany relative to 
Belgium.   
 
IV.1.2.3. Eventual Level of Adjudication  
 
On the basis of the forgoing analysis no concrete theoretical proposition can be advanced on 
the ultimate effect of legal expenses insurance on the level of adjudication. What is, however, 
clear is that insofar as the insurer is allowed to handle claims himself and to take an active 
role in the settlement process, this is likely to keep more claims out of court. Lack of 
empirical data that combines information on both the parties’ drop and settlement behavior 
prevents us from drawing any final conclusion on the ultimate level of adjudication.  
 
 
IV.2.  Litigation Costs   
 
The effect of legal expenses insurance on litigation costs is relevant to our discussion because 
of two reasons. First, in order to keep insurance premiums at a for consumers attractive level, 
it is of paramount importance that an insurer is able to calculate the risk carried by a policy 
underwritten, and can keep control of and reduce costs181. Second, as we’ve already 
mentioned before, insurance policies typically do not provide full coverage. Consequentially, 
the magnitude of (that part of) the litigation costs born by the insured will determine the 
ultimate extent to which the positive effects of legal expenses insurance on the level of suit 
will effectively contribute to the accessibility of justice. Also, its effects on the insured’s 
attitude to dropping and settling a filed claim are mitigated to the extent that he still expects to 
bear litigation costs.     
In the previous chapter, we’ve discussed how in the current hourly fee system lawyer 
opportunism may affect attorney costs. The source of this moral hazard problem is the conflict 
between the client’s and lawyer’s financial interest in the case: while an hourly lawyer 
benefits from billable hours, his client is only interested in a maximum net return to the case 
and therefore he wants his lawyer to spend only the optimal amount of time on the case. 
When the client has legal expenses insurance, however, the factor that drives a wedge 
between his and his lawyer’s interest is eliminated. Rather than conflict, their interests tend to 
converge, as the insured client doesn’t bear any legal costs and can’t thus anything but benefit 
from additional investments in the case. Therefore, if legal expenses insurance covers the 
entire litigation cost, the client will have every incentive to encourage his lawyer to further 
increase inputs on the case182, while the latter will feel less restricted to behave 
opportunistically given the deep pockets of the insurance company. As a result, the latter 
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181 Kilian (2003) at 42-43.  
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faces a moral hazard problem in his relationship with both the insured and his lawyer. In both 
relationships, however, certain measures can be taken to minimize this problem.   
 
 
IV.2.1. Insurer-Client Relationship 
 
As was mentioned above, co-insurance is the most appropriate instrument to address moral 
hazard in the insurer-client relationship. In most legal expenses insurance policies this is 
already incorporated by means of a deductible, frequently combined with a ceiling on the 
amount of coverage183. Yet, this doesn’t provide the insured with appropriate incentives to 
keep control of costs above and below the respective limits to his policy184. Actually, the form 
of moral hazard at hand is most effectively countered by co-payment: this requires the insured 
to pay a fraction of the entire cost185. This solution, however, suffers from some limitations. 
First, co-insurance allows to keep premiums down, but at the downside it also limits insurance 
coverage and thereby the attractiveness of the insurance, in particular when both a deductible 
and co-payment are combined. Second, relative ignorance and limited monitoring possibilities 
typically prevent clients from entirely keeping control of lawyer opportunism even when a 
claim is privately funded. They for sure won’t do a better job if they only bear (internalize) 
part of the litigation costs (benefits).            
 
 
IV.2.2. Insurer-Lawyer Relationship 
 
Given the limitations of co-insurance, insurers also try to achieve a more effective control and 
reduction of costs directly in their relationship with legal service providers. Basically, three 
different options may be open to legal expenses insurers in this respect. But more than in the 
insurer-client relationship, the feasibility of these options is dependent on, and restricted by 
mandatory regulation.   
 
IV.2.2.1. Formal Fee Regulation 
 
Often cited in relation to the success of legal expenses insurance in Germany is the option to 
improve the predictability of attorney costs through formal regulation of attorney fees186. 
When based on fixed fees, such as the German BRAGO system, this also allows for better 
cost control187. In Belgium, however, insurers cannot rely on any formal fee regulation, 
neither binding nor indicative, after the withdrawal of the recommendation of the former 
National Bar Association in this respect188. Recently, some have mentioned attorney fee 
                                                 
183 See supra text accompanying notes 151 and 154.  
184 Deductibles can even increase the moral hazard that raises the size of potential losses, see Economist (1995).  
185 Id.  
186 Kilian (2003) at 42.  
187 There is no need to control the hours a lawyer effectively spent as the fixed fees are calculated independent 
from the amount of time spent on the case. Of course, quality control is not solved by this.  
188 Lamon (2002) at 4.  
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regulation as a means to curb the increased expenditures effect cost shifting entails but this 
suggestion seems to carry anything but general support189.   
 
IV.2.2.2. In-House Services  
 
No doubt, cost control and reduction, in addition to quality control, can be most effectively 
achieved through the provision of legal services by in-house salaried personal190. This option 
holds certain potential for Belgian insurers as lawyers’ monopoly rights only extent to 
representation in court. As mentioned before, insurers make frequent use of this option to 
foster settlement191. However, its prospects are limited because policyholders have always the 
right to free choice of counsel from the moment they are involved in judicial or administrative 
proceedings192. Further, an insurer can only provide in-house services through jurists, as the 
independence of the legal profession does not allow lawyers to work in salaried 
employment193.  
 
IV.2.2.3. Direct Control and Self-Enforcing Mechanisms  
 
Finally, absent formal attorney fee regulation and given the limited possibility to provide in-
house services, insurers will necessarily have to rely on direct control and self-enforcing 
mechanisms194. To that end, an insurer will preferably invest effort in building up an open-
ended relationship with a selected number of lawyers and law firms, which handle legal 
expenses insurance cases on a routine basis with the prospect of future business born in mind.     
This is also observed in practice. It is, for example, very common for a legal expenses 
insurer and a lawyer to set up their own long term informal fee structure195. Also, the Flemish 
Bar Association and the professional association of insurers have agreed on a body of soft law 
governing the legal expenses insurer-lawyer relationship196. This does not only provide a 
general framework within which an insured’s dispute is handled, but also allows for better 
control of lawyer performance and costs, both directly (time records, work sheets, etc.) and 
indirectly (exchange of information, mutual consultation, etc.). Even so, an insurer will still 
face certain practical, economical and/or legal barriers, which prevent him from exercising 
full control over lawyer performance. In particular, quality control may be very hard to 
accomplish pending the case’s outcome.  
Here, however, the prospect of future business steps in to cover for this lack of direct 
control. More than likely, a full evaluation of lawyer performance by the insurer’s legal 
                                                 
189 See, e.g., Orde van Vlaamse Balies (2006), Van Parys (2006).  
190 Kilian (2003) at 43. 
191 See supra text accompanying notes 178 and 180.  
192 Article 4.1 (a) Directive 87/344/EC on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions 
relating to Legal Expenses Insurance, official reporter EC Nr. L 185, 4 July 1987, 77.  
193 See the regulation of the attorney statute in Orde van Vlaamse Balies (2005).   
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personnel is feasible after the case is closed, as opposed to before197. This enables the latter to 
sanction lawyer opportunism ex post through withdrawal of future business. In anticipation of 
this, a lawyer will rationally abstain from shirking as long as he expects the future income 
from the insurer-lawyer relationship to exceed the profit he can earn by economizing on 
quality in a case at hand. In this respect, a more moderated control of lawyer performance 
may suffice to ensure a probability of detection (and thus loss of future income) sufficiently 
high to keep this self-enforcing mechanism running. As a result, the combination of both 
high-qualified legal personnel and the position of large costumer in the market for legal 
services may allow a legal expenses insurer to control lawyer opportunism to quite a 
reasonable extent. Moreover, given the oversupply which characterizes the Belgian market for 
legal services, this self-enforcing mechanism may even extent to lawyers which were 
appointed by an individual policyholder on the basis of his right to free choice of counsel.  
 
 
IV.3. Duration of Claims  
 
IV.3.1. Dropped Claims  
 
Crucial to our discussion on the effect of legal expenses insurance on the drop rate was the 
strong incentive of an insurer to keep track of claim quality, opposed to the skewed incentives 
hourly lawyers may have in this respect198. As a result, a self-financing plaintiff is rather left 
to his own advice when deciding whether or not the drop his claim, while a plaintiff holding 
legal expenses insurance is in fact more likely to be confronted with his insurer’s decision to 
drop a claim than to drop the claim himself. This fundamental difference is very likely to be 
reflected in claims that are privately funded to take longer to be dropped than claims covered 
by legal expenses insurance. Simply because an insurer is much more competent than a self-
financing plaintiff to collect, process and evaluate the relevant information on the basis of 
which the decision to drop a claim is taken.  
 
 
IV.3.2. Settled Claims 
 
As an insurer can save costs if the case doesn’t go to court, legal expenses insurers typically 
reserve themselves the right to foster settlement199. Therefore, if the insured’s claim actually 
gets settled, it should normally take shorter than if the case were privately funded and thus 
settled by an hourly lawyer. The reason is that an insurer internalizes the full opportunity cost 
of his time, as opposed to an hourly lawyer who gets actually paid for spending more time on 
a case and is thus likely to shirk as his performance is typically only partially verifiable by his 
client. An insurer’s personnel may shirk as well, but no doubt the employer-employee 
relationship leaves much more room for control, incentive payments, etc. than the relationship 
                                                 
197 As legal expenses insurers employ legally trained personnel and hire lawyers on a daily basis, legal services 
are very likely to be experience rather than credence goods to them. See also supra text accompanying note 100.  
198 See supra text accompanying notes 170-172.  
199 See supra text accompanying note 176.  
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between a lawyer and his client. Most importantly, however, even when not the insurer settles 
the case, but a lawyer that was appointed by him (or even by the insured), one might expect it 
to take shorter given the prospects, we’ve just discussed, the insurer-lawyer relationship holds 
for keeping control of lawyer opportunism.  
This has been empirically confirmed by Fenn et al. (2006:24-25), who report that in 
England and Wales settled claims covered by legal expenses insurance have shorter durations 
by comparison with all other forms of case funding.  
 
 
IV.3.3. Adjudicated Claims 
 
Finally, the insurer’s control over the duration of claims will be most restricted when claims 
are disposed of through adjudication. That is because from the moment a case goes to court 
the insurer has to guarantee his client the right to free choice of counsel200. Insofar as the latter 
prefers his own choice to the insurer’s, the latter mainly will have to rely on direct control to 
keep the lawyer from shirking and spending too much time on pre-trial and trial proceedings. 
But just as when the case is settled by a lawyer and not by the insurer himself, one still may 
expect the insurer’s legally trained personnel to do a much more effective job than a typical 
self-financing plaintiff. In addition, given the oversupply which characterzes the Belgian 
market for legal services today, again, one could argue that merely the hope for future 
business might (partially) trigger the self-enforcing mechanism and lead lawyers, even when 
appointed by the insured, to behave less opportunistally.  
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
To conclude, let us first reconsider the policy issue addressed in this paper. At present time, 
apart from legal aid, private funding is the dominant method of funding a civil claim in 
Belgium. The economic analysis presented in this paper has indirectly pointed at four failures 
of the current funding scheme which all add to the relative inaccessibility of civil justice 
today. First, as far as the letter of the law concerns, the basic principle of indemnity of 
litigation costs does not apply to attorney and expert costs. As a result, there is a considerable 
risk that a perfectely valid claim turns out to be a negative expected value suit. If the amount 
at stake is relatively low, this may even be the case when there is a 100 pct chance of 
prevailing at trial. Second, typically legal expenses, including attorney costs, have to be paid 
before any award has been collected to cover costs. Thus liquidity constrained plaintiffs who 
cannot afford the upfront payment of legal costs, are prevented from asserting their subjective 
rights, even when their claim has a positive expected value. Third, as in the private funding 
scheme the entire cost and proceed risk is allocated to the client, it paves the way for the 
plaintiff’s likely risk aversion to further obstruct the access to civil justice. Finally, the current 
funding scheme doesn’t offer any direct possibility to address the typical client-lawyer agency 
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problems, which cause both litigation costs to rise and the client’s interest to be neglected. 
This is reflected in all different stages of the dispute resolution model, leading clients to be 
wrongly advised on the quality of their claim, lawyers taking too long to settle and putting too 
little effort, and so forth.  
The prospects for improving the access to civil justice of the alternative funding options 
subject to this study, can be evaluated most effectively by considering the extent to which 
they allow to overcome the failures inherent to the current funding scheme. From a theoretical 
point of view, at first sight, cost shifting appears the most appropriate method for solving the 
first of the aforementioned failures. By shifting litigation costs to the losing party at trial, one 
would indeed expect the English rule to clear the path at least for highly meritorious claims, 
even when they have a relatively low potential award. However, the empirical evidence 
presented by Snyder and Hughes (1990:364) suggests that, when a cost-shifting rule applies, 
parties’ greater expenditures, the increased litigation risk and the defendant’s outspending 
weigh that much on the claim’s expected value that the English rule has an overall negative 
effect. Apparentenly, aggrevating rather than solving the other failures of the private funding 
scheme, cost shifting leads plaintiffs only to continue a selected subset of claims that combine 
a high probability of success with a relatively large potential award. It should, however, be 
noted that the validity of this empirical observation is subject to certain limitations. First, the 
empirical evidence we’ve discussed is only concerned with a full-blown cost-shifting rule that 
holds the losing party liable for all reasonable costs. Also, the theoretical analysis is 
essentially inconclusive on the ultimate effect the English rule has on the volume of suit and 
drop rate. Therefore, it’s perfectly possible that under a more moderated indemnity rule that 
only shifts costs up to a certain limit, the English rule’s positive effects on a claim’s expected 
value are not outweighed by the the greater expenditures effect, the increased litigation risk 
and the defendant’s outspending. Further, one could argue that the increased expenditures 
effect as observed by Snyder and Hughes (1990:374) can, to a large extent, be attributed to 
the typical characterstics of US medical malpractice litigation, which is much more 
accusatorial than the Belgian civil justice administration system.  
As opposed to the English rule, which doesn’t incorporate any risk sharing benefits and only 
increases the risk and costs of litigation, contingency fees hold clear prospects for overcoming 
risk aversion and liquidity constraints. However, it follows from the economic dispute 
resolution model that a claim will only be brought on a contingency fee basis when not only 
the client’s but also the lawyer’s expected value is positive. Therefore, contrary to what is 
commonly believed, this improved accesibility of justice does not neccessarily imply a 
deterioration of claim quality. The effects of fee arrangements on lawyer opportunism are 
more ambiguous. In a contingency fee as well as in an hourly fee setting, lawyers may 
capitalize on clients’ relative ignorance and the limited verifiability of their performance. But 
while mainly fee negotations were found to be suspectible to contingency lawyer 
opportunism, the entire dispute resolution model appears to be fraud with potential grounds 
for opportunistic behavior by hourly lawyers, especially when they have uncommitted time. 
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This is most illustratively reflected in the fact that actually hourly fees rather than contingency 
fees promote frivolous litigation. Not surprisingly, Brickman (2003a:106) suggests that the 
overall agency costs in hourly fee arrangements are excessive compared to the costs of 
contingency lawyer opportunism. 
Finally, to the extent costs are covered by an insurance policy, legal expenses insurance has 
a positive effect on a claim’s expected value. Also, legal expenses insurance improves the 
access to civil justice of plaintiffs that are risk-averse and/or liquidity constraint. Moral 
harzard, adverse selection and market-driven incentives were shown to induce insurers, either 
directly or indirectly, not to offer coverage for claims that lack merit or have a relatively low 
potential award. Furthermore, within the current legal framework, there does not appear to be 
any fundamental obstacle to the development of a market for legal expenses insurance. 
However, absent a formal fee regulation, insurance companies can only keep control of cost 
through direct control and self-enforcing mechanisms as well as the provision of in-house 
services. If this allows legal expenses insurance to successfully expand its range, this may not 
only lower prices, but also benefit consumers as enhanced control may lead lawyers to behave 
less opportunistically. But, on the other hand, it remains unclear whether lawyers will actually 
redirect their behavior in the interest of the client. It doesn’t seem unrealistic at all that as the 
market for legal expenses insurance grows and insurers increase their hold of the demand for 
legal services, lawyers rather will redirect their behavior in the insurers’ interest. This in turn 
points at potential grounds for opportunistic behavior by the insurer, which however were 
generally left undiscussed here. This leaves an open and interesting field for further research 
on the extent to which clients’ relative ignorance, limited monitoring abilities and market 
incentives, in combination with insurers’ increasingly dominant position in the market for 
legal services may allow them to behave opportunistally towards their clients. It may well be 
that the expansion of the market for legal expenses insurance will ignite a call for regulation 
to safeguard lawyers’ independency in order to achieve the right balance in the client-lawyer-
insurer nexus of contracts. The potential problem of insurer opportunism may be even much 
more imminent insofar as insurance companies may provide in-house services. As their direct 
involvement in the civil justice administration system increases, one could openly question 
whether legal expenses insurers shouldn’t be subject to similar provision as those currently 
governing the client-lawyer relationship. But for now, it’s clear that any regulatory 
intervention in this respect will have to deal with a subtle trade-off between protecting the 
interest of individual clients, and the promotion and expansion of the market for legal 
expenses insurance in globo which requires insurers’ direct or indirect control.  
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